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Abstract— Financial discussion boards (FDBs) have been 
widely used for a variety of financial knowledge exchange 
activities through the posting of comments. Popular public FDBs 
are prone to being used as a medium to spread false financial 
information due to larger audience groups. Although online 
forums are usually integrated with anti-spam tools such as 
Akismet, moderation of posted content heavily relies on manual 
tasks. Unfortunately, the daily comments volume received on 
popular FDBs realistically prevents human moderators to watch 
closely and moderate possibly fraudulent content, not to mention 
moderators are not usually assigned with such task. Due to the 
absence of useful tools, it is extremely time consuming and 
expensive to manually read and determine whether each 
comment is potentially fraudulent. This paper presents novel 
forward and backward analysis methodologies implemented in 
an Information Extraction (IE) prototype system named FDBs 
Miner (FDBM). The methodologies aim to detect potentially 
illegal Pump and Dump comments on FDBs with the integration 
of per-minute share prices in the detection process. This can 
possibly reduce false positives during the detection as it 
categorises the potentially illegal comments into different risk 
levels for investigation purposes. The proposed system extracts 
company’s ticker symbols (i.e. unique symbol that represents and 
identifies each listed company on stock market), comments and 
share prices from FDBs based in the UK. The forward analysis 
methodology flags the potentially Pump and Dump comments 
using a predefined keywords template and labels the flagged 
comments with price hike thresholds. Subsequently, the 
backward analysis methodology employs a moving average 
technique to determine price abnormalities and backward 
analyse the flagged comments. First detection stage in forward 
analysis found 9.82% potentially illegal comments. It is 
unrealistic and unaffordable for human moderators or financial 
surveillance authorities to read these comments on a daily basis. 
Hence, by integrating share prices to perform backward analysis 
can categorise the flagged comments into different risk levels. It 
helps relevant authorities to prioritise and investigate into the 
higher risk flagged comments, which could potentially indicate a 
real Pump and Dump crime happening on FDBs when the system 
is being used in real time. 
Keywords— Financial Discussion Boards; Financial Crimes; 
Pump and Dump; Text Mining; Information Extraction 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Internet has become the number one source for information 
for unlimited things. Unsurprisingly, this includes financial 
advice and investor sentiments. There are many online forums 
where likeminded people can hold conversations in the form of 
posted messages. Financial Discussion Boards (FDBs), also 
known as Financial Message Boards or Financial Forums 
allows investors to exchange knowledge, information, 
experience and opinions about the investment opportunities. 
There is a few popular share price based FDBs based in the UK 
which specifically allows investors to discuss share prices. 
These FDBs include the London South East
1
, Interactive 
Investor (III)
2
 and ADVFN
3
. 
Normally, forum content is moderated by human 
moderators when it is discovered or reported for breaching 
forum rules such as racism, sexism, hatred, foul language, third 
party advertisements and so on. Although online forums seem 
to be a useful source of information, not all information shared 
on the forums is accurate or truthful. Even anti-spam plugins 
such as Akismet
4
 could only prevent spammers from 
registering or posting generic spam messages. There is little to 
no measurements taken by forum moderators or financial 
surveillance authorities to monitor and detect potential crimes 
on the FDBs, such as comments indicative of Pump and Dump 
(P&D). 
 
  1 http://www.lse.co.uk 
  2 http://www.iii.co.uk 
  3 http://uk.advfn.com 
  4 https://akismet.com 
 2 | P a g e  
 
P&D can happen if an organised group of false investors 
decided to attack shares by buying and selling a specific share 
in a scheduled time frame and giving the market false 
statements about the share throughout the process. Textual 
comments such as “This is the right time let’s start pumping 
this share” can reveal a hidden potential illegal activity of P&D 
on these FDBs. Novice investors can be easily deceived and 
make huge losses during the “dump” while the fraudsters take 
huge profits. Without a tool, manual monitoring and detection 
of potentially illegal activities on popular and active FDBs can 
cost time and money heavily, which is impracticable in the 
long run. 
There has been research conducted around the area of share 
price based FDBs associated with P&D financial crimes [1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6]. Research from recent years highlighted that the 
comments on FDBs were found manipulative and positively 
related to the market returns, volatility and trading volumes [7, 
8, 9, 10, 11]. However, there is very little attempt [5, 6] made 
to build tools for monitoring and detection of potential 
financial crimes on share price based FDBs. Furthermore, other 
than the initial work presented in [12], none of the other 
existing research take share prices into account when designing 
a financial surveillance tool for detection of potentially illegal 
FDB comments. 
FDBs contain semantically understandable artefacts (i.e. 
FDBs’ artefacts that can be processed by computers) such as 
stock ticker symbols, date, time, prices, comment author 
usernames and comments. Information Extraction (IE) is 
defined as the process of extracting information automatically 
into a structured data format from an unstructured or semi-
structured data sources [13]. Therefore, IE techniques are used 
in this research to extract and analyse these data. IE has been 
used in other areas such as accounting [14] and search engine 
[15]. However, other than the initial work described in [6] and 
[16], there is very little usage of IE techniques in FDBs’ 
financial crimes related research. 
Two novel methodologies, i.e. forward analysis and 
backward analysis, introduced in this paper are implemented in 
a prototype system named FDBs Miner (FDBM). The 
methodologies are used to detect potential P&D crimes on 
FDBs by flagging potentially illegal comments and reduce 
false positives (i.e. errors present in evaluation processes or 
scientific tests that are mistakenly found) during the detection 
process. FDBM could significantly support financial 
surveillance authorities to regulate by enabling real-time 
monitoring and alerting based on fraudulent risk levels. 
In the forward analysis methodology, all the potentially 
illegal comments will first be highlighted and flagged. This is 
done by analysing the comments against the predefined P&D 
IE keywords template. Next, it matches and appends the price 
figure to the flagged comments which share the same or closest 
date and time based on same ticker symbol. Subsequently, the 
forward analyser takes each flagged comment’s price as a base 
price and calculate ± 2 days’ worth of prices to check if there is 
any price hike 5%, 10% and 15% more than the base price. 
Finally, it appends the price hike threshold labels to these 
flagged comments. By doing so, a relevant authority can pick 
the comments belong to any threshold depending on the 
severity for investigations. Although forward analysis has 
drastically reduced the number of comments needed to be read 
by relevant authorities, the amount of categorised flagged 
comments could still be somewhat large to read on a daily 
basis. Thus, a backward analysis methodology is designed to 
overcome this issue. 
In the backward analysis methodology, simple moving 
average method is used to calculate and highlight the price 
hikes. Any price hikes that hit certain price hike thresholds will 
be matched backwards to the flagged comments found in the 
forward analysis stage. Such matches are done so that the 
already flagged comments can be further classified to reduce 
false positives and allow investigators to quickly examine on 
the higher and highest risked flagged comments before 
everything else. 
Section II describes some examples of FDBs related 
financial crimes and reviews the background and usage of 
Information Extraction (IE) and Text Mining. Section III 
presents the architecture overview of the FDBs Miner (FDBM) 
prototype system and an overview of the FDBs dataset (FDB-
DS). This followed by Section IV and V introducing the two 
novel methodologies (i.e. forward analysis and backward 
analysis) respectively and discussing the findings. Lastly, 
Section VI concludes the research and proposes some future 
work. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section first provides a few related and significant 
examples of financial crimes on share price based FDBs, 
followed by the literature review related to IE and text mining 
which are the techniques used in this research for locating 
meaningful information, and collection and formation of 
datasets respectively. Lastly, Pump and Dump (P&D) and 
FDBs related literature review will also be presented. 
A. Financial Crimes on Share Price Based FDBs 
Generally, there are many P&D financial crimes happening 
which are actively investigated and dealt by the Security 
Exchange Commission (SEC) for many years. However, P&D 
crimes on FDBs are loosely monitored by FDB moderators and 
relevant authorities. There were several popular FDB related 
P&D financial crimes in early years, which are highlighted as 
follows: 
 15-year-old Jonathan Lebed was the first minor to 
involve in a stock market fraud in 2000 [3]. Lebed 
earned a total revenue of US$800,000 by pumping the 
share price through Yahoo! Finance Message Board 
over half a year and charged by Security Exchange 
Commission (SEC) [3, 4]. 
 In 2000, two were being charged for pumping the 
price of a share by 10,000% by posting on Raging 
Bull message board and then dumped millions of 
shares which the profit made was at least US$5 
million [3]. 
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 In addition in 2009, eight participants were charged 
by Security Exchange Commission (SEC)
5
 for being 
involved in penny stock manipulation throughout the 
year of 2006 and 2007. These wrongdoers met each 
other through a popular penny stock message board. 
Based on the above FDBs related P&D financial crimes, 
instead of investigating into the crimes after being committed – 
which is probably too late as the harm has been done - there is 
certainly a need to create methods and tools for detection of 
potentially illegal FDB comments in real time. 
B. Information Extraction and Text Mining 
This research makes use of Information Extraction (IE) and 
Text Mining. IE is being defined [17] as the process of 
extracting information automatically into a structured data 
format from an unstructured or semi-structured data sources. It 
was suggested [18] that there is a need for systems that extract 
information automatically from text data. IE is not Information 
Retrieval (IR) [19]. The difference between IE and IR is that IE 
extracts information that fits predefined templates or databases 
and then presents the information to the users, whereas IR finds 
data and present the information to the users. IE systems are 
knowledge-intensive as these systems extract only snippets of 
information that will fit predefined templates (fixed format) 
which represent useful and relevant information about the 
domain then display to the user. 
IE is divided into two fundamental classes i.e. Knowledge 
Engineering (KE) approach and automatic training approach. 
KE approach is also called as the rule-based approach since it 
requires rules to be developed by the human expertise. Rule-
based approach is usually ignored in the research community, 
but it is mostly favourable in the commercial market even by 
the large vendors such as IBM (for text analysis systems) and 
Microsoft (enterprise search platform) [20]. Rule-based IE 
systems are easy to maintain and comprehend as well as errors 
being traced and fixed easily. On the other hand, although 
automatic training approach, also known as machine learning 
approach, requires less manual efforts, the approach requires 
pre-labelled data and retraining for adaptation [20]. This paper 
focuses on IE implementation since it is designed to support 
the financial market surveillance authorities. 
Text mining was described [21] as the process to extract 
useful information from unformatted textual data or natural 
language text into a form of meaningful knowledge for 
processing. According to [22], the research shows that there 
was a significant amount of users on Twitter (32%) and 
Facebook (20%) were actively seeking or sharing advice about 
their favourite products at least once a week. This means the 
likelihood of getting deceptive information is also significant. 
Similarly, on popular share price based FDBs that receive a 
significant amount of comments in each day, novice investors 
who seek investment advice could also be deceived easily. 
Also a text mining based study was conducted [23] on Twitter 
dataset and its relationship to be able to predict stock prices. In 
addition to stock price trends were also being successfully 
forecasted via press releases using text mining techniques [24]. 
 
5 http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21053.htm 
In this paper, text mining is used alongside IE rule-based 
technique to extract and analyse FDB artefacts such as 
comments, prices and stock ticker symbols. 
C. Pump and Dump and Share Price Based FDBs 
 Traditionally, Pump and Dump (P&D) happens mostly 
through word of mouth. But with the existence of the Internet, 
it becomes so common that the fraudsters commit crimes 
through various channels such as emails, discussion boards and 
social media. 
As spam emails is one of the older tactics, regulators like 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has been actively 
taking actions against P&D spam campaign fraudsters. Email 
spam filters are also constantly being improved by Internet 
services such as Google and Symantec. In a research [25], a 
total of 1,299 suspicious stock recommendation emails was 
obtained. It involved 221 stocks recommended in 252 
advertising campaigns. An event study and a sentiment 
analysis have been conducted on whether P&D involving the 
internet is still an issue in today’s world. Unsurprisingly, the 
research empirically proved that the internet still plays a major 
role in enhancing this type financial crime. Due to the 
limitations in spam emails, newer tactics such as social media 
and discussion boards were adopted mainly because these 
channels allow more freedom of speech. Other researchers [7, 
8, 9, 10, 11] have found the relation between FDB comments 
and market performance. FDB comments can be manipulative 
and affect the share prices. 
In [5], the authors introduced a novel classification 
technique for a classifier training in order to automate 
moderation tasks on online discussion sites (ODSs). A partially 
labelled corpus is used for the training purpose and then 
attempt to moderate the inappropriate content on ODSs using 
the technique. The authors implemented and tested the 
technique on a corpus of comments posted on a popular 
Australian FDB named HotCopper
6
. The results indicated that 
the classification technique is helpful and can be used to 
decrease the number of comments that need to be moderated 
by human moderators. However, this system is not yet a fully 
automated moderation system due to the use of partially 
labelled corpus. According to the authors, the misclassification 
errors remain too significant. Besides, the research takes only 
comments into account and no prices involved during the 
classification of comments. 
A system named Financial Discussions Detection System 
(FDDS), an initial work to this research, was proposed by the 
authors in [6] to flag potentially illegal comments made on 
FDBs. The system allows users to create and modify 
predefined templates (i.e. lists of potentially illegal keywords 
that commenters may or frequently use on FDBs), download 
comments from FDBs and matches the downloaded comments 
against the potentially illegal keywords created in earlier steps. 
By looking only at the comments during the detection 
processes appear to be insufficient in terms of accuracy. Thus, 
this paper introduces the novel methodologies in attempt to 
reduce false positives by integrating share prices in the 
detection process. 
 
6 https://hotcopper.com.au 
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The authors in [11] examined whether the messages posted 
on the largest stock message board in Australia, HotCopper, 
has an impact on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 
market. Results show that the FDB messages have impacts on 
the small capitalisation stocks but not affecting the large 
stocks. 
In [26], the authors introduced a software prototype (FMS-
DSS) to support decision making in financial market 
surveillance. FMS-DSS consists of three components i.e. data, 
models and user interface. The system collects both 
unstructured and structured data of the selected listed 
companies. The models take into account of attributes such as 
market segment, market capitalisation, trading volume, age of 
company and so on. Subsequently, attribute scales ranging 
from very low to very high were defined by the regulatory 
authority members. The scales were then used for aggregation 
to determine whether there is suspicious activity happening.  
In attempt to resolve what was missing in existing research, 
share prices are taken into account when flagging potentially 
illegal comments, accompanied by two key novel built-in 
methodologies (namely the forward analysis and the backward 
analysis) for resolving false positives during the comments 
flagging process. 
III. ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW 
This section presents the FDBM architecture which 
consists of several key components. These key components 
are the data crawler, data transformer, FDB dataset (FDB-DS), 
IE keyword template, forward analyser and the backward 
analyser. Fundamentally, FDBM collects data, transform 
unstructured data into structured data format and analyse the 
data using both forward and backward analysers. The forward 
analyser and backward analyser components are used within 
the novel methodologies introduced in this paper attempt to 
resolve false positives during the process of detection of 
potentially illegal comments. 
A. Overview 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the FDBM architecture 
of the prototype system. 
 
 Fig. 1. Architecture Overview Diagram. 
 
Each component in the architecture diagram is described 
as follows: 
 
1. Data Crawler - The data crawler is responsible for 
automatically collecting unstructured data from the 
three FDBs (i.e. LSE, III and ADVFN) at different 
time intervals for 12 weeks (from 23
rd 
September 
2014 to 22
nd
 December 2014). These unstructured 
and semi-structure data consist of 941 ticker symbols 
that were listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE), 
FTSE100 and FTSE AIM All-Share, 1-minute bar 
price figures for all the 941 companies and all the 
available FDB comments belong to the 941 
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companies. As an effort for potential future work, 
director deals data and broker ratings data were also 
collected. Table 1 in Section B summarises the total 
sum of collected data. 
2. Data Transformer - Once the data collection is done 
by the data crawler, the data transformer extracts and 
converts the collected unstructured data in various 
formats such as HTML, CSV and XML into 
structured data.  
 
3. FDB Dataset (FDB-DS) – After the collected data is 
being processed by the data transformer, the 
structured data such as price figures, comments, 
comment author usernames, date and time of 
comments and prices are stored in the FDB-DS 
accordingly. For example, the ticker symbols are 
parsed into `ticker` table, price data are parsed into 
`price` table and comment data are parsed into 
`comment` table. The FDB-DS is also responsible to 
store additional data produced from research 
analysis. 
 
Fig. 2. FDB Dataset Structure. 
4. IE Templates – The Pump and Dump IE keyword 
template has been created and saved locally in the 
prototype system in a text (TXT) file format. It can 
be easily modified whenever needed. The IE 
keyword template consists of a series of keywords 
and phrases that were thoroughly researched [2, 27, 
28, 29] and has been validated by experts in the 
relevant field. The IE keyword template will be used 
by the forward and backward analysers for the 
comments flagging process. Section C shows a 
sample list of the keywords and phrases. 
 
5. Forward Analyser – The forward analyser matches 
the Pump and Dump IE keyword template against the 
comments in order to flag potentially illegal FDB 
comments. Followed by matching the prices to the 
flagged comments, calculating and labelling price 
thresholds. The novel methodology used in this 
component is further discussed in Section IV. 
 
6. Backward Analyser – Backward analyser performs 
the calculation and labelling of price hikes using a 
price moving average technique i.e. simple moving 
average (SMA). This calculation is applied against a  
 
total of 29 million price figures which belong to 941 
companies. Subsequently, price hike SMA alerts will 
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be matched back towards the initially flagged 
comments in forward analysis process. This 
methodology is further elaborated in Section V. 
B. Dataset Acquisition 
Table 1 provides an overview of the FDB dataset (FDB-
DS) in this research. These data were collected between 23
rd 
September 2014 to 22
nd
 December 2014. 
TABLE 1.           TOTAL NUMBER OF ARTEFACT RECORDS (FDB-DS)  
Artefacts Total number of records 
Ticker Symbols 941 
Comments 507,970 
Prices 28,980,465 
Director Deals 11,456 
Broker Ratings 6,469 
 
As mentioned in earlier section, these 941 ticker symbols 
were collected from two of the LSE’s indices i.e. 100 ticker 
symbols from FTSE100 and 841 ticker symbols from FTSE 
AIM All-Share. The comments, which belong to all these 
ticker symbols, made within the 12 weeks were collected from 
both LSE and III. As for prices, these are 12 weeks’ worth of 
1-minute bar share prices belong to all the 941 ticker symbols. 
Director deals and broker ratings related to all the ticker 
symbols were also collected for potential future work. The 
following is an overview of the FDB-DS structure. 
C. IE Template 
Pump & Dump (P&D) IE keyword template is populated 
by obtaining the keywords from the P&D comments 
demonstrated in existing research [6, 27, 28, 29]. The 
following is a sample list of the keywords and phrases: 
 
 Pump dump 
 Once in a lifetime 
 Pump the price 
 Keep ramping 
 Buy now 
 Good future 
 Invested so heavily 
 It will fly 
 Sell now 
 This is the chance 
 Price will go up 
 Buy as quickly as possible 
 Get out while you can 
IV. FORWARD ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
This section introduces the novel forward analysis 
methodology. The aim of this methodology is to flag and filter 
the potentially illegal P&D comments using P&D keyword 
template with the integration of the share prices in the analysis 
process. This will categorise the flagged comments into 
different risk levels and allows relevant authorities to 
investigate into the flagged comments more realistically in 
terms of time and efforts. 
The forward analysis methodology in this section will test 
the following hypothesis: 
 
H0a: Pump and Dump activity from FDBs can be filtered 
using template based IE and their correlation with 
price movements.  
H1a: Pump and Dump activity from FDBs cannot be 
filtered using template based IE and their correlation 
with price movements. 
 
As shown in the architecture diagram in Figure 1, the 
forward analysis component contains several functions. These 
functions (i.e. comments flagging, price matching, threshold 
calculation and threshold labelling) that are part of the forward 
analysis methodology which will be discussed below. 
A. Methodology 
The following describes the steps taken in this 
methodology to flag potentially illegal comments: 
1) Comments Flagging 
i. Firstly, the forward analyser matches all the 
available keywords and phrases from the Pump 
and Dump IE keyword template against all the 
507,970 comments which were stored in FDB 
dataset (FDB-DS).  
ii. The flagged comments which deemed potentially 
illegal are imported into FDB-DS as a new 
database table named `flaggedcomment`. 
2) Price and Comments Matching 
i. Once `flaggedcomment` has been populated, the 
forward analyser appends the price to each 
flagged comment by matching the ticker symbol 
and the exact or nearest date and time. This step 
is done to ensure a “base price” is set for each 
flagged comment. The “base price” will be used 
for threshold labelling in next step. Due to the 
extremely large 12 weeks’ worth of price data 
belongs to 941 companies, the process of setting 
a “base price” takes up to a week to complete. 
3) Comments Threshold Labelling 
i. After having all the “base price” set for each 
flagged comment in the previous step, the 
forward analyser labels each flagged comment 
with thresholds. Due to the large data set, the 
threshold labelling process takes up to five days 
to complete all threshold calculations. To 
determine whether a flagged comment’s base 
price exceeds any thresholds (i.e. various levels 
of spikes in prices), the forward analyser 
calculates all the ± 2 days’ per-minute prices 
against the “base price” of each flagged 
comment. 
ii. When there is a trigger, a flagged comment will 
be labelled accordingly. The threshold labelling 
rules are as follows: 
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 Flagged comments that have no price figure 
(due to empty price figures collected from 
ADVFN) is labelled as “N” (Null). 
 If any of the ± 2 days prices calculated 
against the “base price” indicates a 5% price 
hike the comment is labelled as “Y” 
(Yellow). 
 If any of the ± 2 days prices calculated 
against the “base price” indicates a 10% 
price hike the comment is labelled as “A” 
(Amber). 
 If any of the ± 2 days prices calculated 
against the “base price” indicates a 15% 
price hike the comment is labelled as “R” 
(Red). 
 Flagged comments that do not trigger any 
thresholds are labelled as “C”. 
B. Forward Analysis Methodology Results 
By matching the keywords and phrases from P&D IE 
keyword template against all the 507,970 comments, a total 
number of 49,858 comments were flagged as potentially illegal 
comments (as shown in Table 2). These flagged comments 
took up 9.82% of the total comments. 
TABLE II.           TOTAL NUMBER OF FLAGGED COMMENTS 
Comments Total Percentage 
Flagged 49,858 9.82% 
Non-flagged 458,112 90.18% 
Grand Total 507,970 100% 
 
Out of all the 49,858 flagged comments, 3,613 (7.25%) of 
the flagged comments triggered the “R” 15% price hike 
threshold, 2,555 (5.12%) flagged comments triggered the “A” 
10% price hike threshold and 5,197 (10.42%) flagged 
comments triggered the “Y” 5% price hike threshold. 37,895 
(76.01%) flagged comments labelled as “C” did not trigger any 
price thresholds. The total number of flagged comments that 
triggered the thresholds is summarised in Table 3 and 
visualised in Figure 3. 
TABLE III.           TOTAL NUMBER OF FLAGGED COMMENTS IN 
EACH PRICE HIKE THRESHOLD 
Threshold Total Percentage 
C (<5%) 37,895 76.01% 
Y (5%) 5,197 10.42% 
A (10%) 2,555 5.12% 
R (15%) 3,613 7.25% 
Null 598 1.2% 
Grand Total 49,858 100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Total number and percentage of each threshold. 
 The results show the possibility to filter comments that may 
be indicative of Pump and Dump activities by using template 
based IE and the correlation with price movements. For 12 
weeks’ worth of 941 companies’ share prices data, the forward 
analyser took approximately seven days to completely 
calculate all the price thresholds and labelling the flagged 
comments. The length of time taken in this process heavily 
relied on the computer machine power and the efficiency of the 
programming in FDBM. In this research, the server machine 
used is a quad core CPU (2.50GHz Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-
2680 v3). Although the forward analysis process takes a long 
time to process, this is due to the massive amount of data being 
processed altogether in this research. In real world scenario, 
this methodology can significantly help relevant authorities to 
narrow down and focus on the potentially illegal comments 
with higher risks. Therefore, the hypothesis for this section is 
met. 
V. BACKWARD ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
As an enhancement to the forward analysis process, the 
novel backward analysis process will test whether simple 
moving average (SMA) technique can be used to reduce false 
positives in the comments flagging process by highlighting 
abnormalities in the share prices and backward classify the 
flagged comments. 
 
The backward analysis methodology in this section will 
test the following hypothesis: 
 
H0b: Backward analysis can be performed by matching 
abnormal stock prices with the flagged comments to 
further classify flagged comments to reduce false 
positive. 
 
37895, 
76.01% 
5197, 
10.42% 
2555, 
5.12% 
3613, 
7.25% 
598, 
1.20% 
Total number of flagged comments in 
each price hike threshold 
C (<5%) Y (5%) A (10%) R (15%) Null
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H1b: Backward analysis cannot be performed by matching 
abnormal stock prices with the flagged comments to 
further classify flagged comments to reduce false 
positive. 
 
Moving average is one of the technical analysis methods 
that is often being used by financial analysts to predict the 
future price patterns, learning stocks’ behaviour and trends by 
studying historical price data. The most basic moving average 
technique being used by financial analysts is SMA. Some 
research even used such moving average techniques to predict 
the rate of traffic congestions and road accidents [30]. 
However, it appears that there was no attempt to integrate 
moving average technique in the detection process of potential 
FDB crimes in the past. 
 
The backward analysis attempts to use SMA to test if it 
can be of helpful to detect flagged comments while reducing 
false positives. SMA technique is integrated and applied to the 
share prices before performing backward analysis. Moving 
average technique is used in backward analysis because it can 
calculate and highlight whether a price figure exceeds a 
certain threshold. The following section discusses the 
methodology to perform backward analysis. 
A. Methodology 
The following describes the steps taken to produce results 
for analysis: 
 
1) Moving Average Calculation 
i. Firstly, decide time periods use for this 
experiment i.e. 1 day, 3 days and 5 days. 
ii. Next, calculate the Simple Moving Average 
(SMA) using its formula as below and record 
calculation results in database: 
 
   
2) Alert Labelling 
i. Apply 5%, 10% and 15% thresholds calculation 
based on the calculated SMA figures and save in 
database table. Table III shows an example of 
the threshold calculations, assuming the SMA is 
$15.4: 
TABLE III. SMA THRESHOLD CALCULATION EXAMPLE 
Threshold SMA Threshold Price 
5% $15.4 * 1.05 = $16.17 
10% $15.4 * 1.10 = $16.94 
15% $15.4 * 1.15 = $17.71 
 
ii. Once the SMA figures and threshold figures 
above SMA are obtained, check each original 
price against the calculated threshold figures. If 
an original price exceeds the calculated threshold 
figure, label these threshold alerts accordingly 
(i.e. 5%, 10% or 15%). The alert labelling rules 
are as follows: 
o Label as “5%” -  if the original price figure 
of a particular date and time is between 5% 
and 10% higher than the SMA price figure. 
o Label as “10%” -  if the original price 
figure of a particular date and time is 
between 10% and 15% higher than the 
SMA price figure. 
o Label as “15%” -  if the original price 
figure of a particular date and time is 15% 
and above the SMA price figure. 
3) Alert Matching 
i. Next, the backward analyser appends the price 
alerts back to the `flaggedcomment` table by 
matching the ticker symbol and the exact or 
nearest date and time between both `price` and 
`flaggedcomment` tables.  
B. Backwards Analysis Methodology Results 
Table IV shows the total number of flagged comments that 
matched 5% threshold from both forward and backward 
analysis for the 1 day, 3 days and 5 days’ time period. Out of 
49,858 flagged comments there are 228 flagged comments 
from the 1 day time period experiment labelled with Y (5% 
threshold from forward analysis) which are also labelled with 
5% threshold from backward analysis. Next, there are 306 
flagged comments from the 3 days’ time period labelled with 
Y (5% threshold from forward analysis) and 5% threshold 
from backward analysis. Lastly, there are 274 flagged 
comments from the 5 days’ time period labelled with Y (5% 
threshold from forward analysis) and 5% threshold from 
backward analysis. 
TABLE IV.          TOTAL NUMBER OF FLAGGED COMMENTS THAT MATCHED 
5% THRESHOLD FROM BOTH FORWARD AND BACKWARD ANALYSIS 
 5% 1D 5% 3D 5% 5D 
C (<5%) 518 1039 1300 
Y (5%) 228 306 274 
A (10%) 89 259 183 
R (15%) 154 126 84 
 
Table V shows the total number of flagged comments that 
matched 10% threshold from both forward and backward 
analysis for the 1 day, 3 days and 5 days’ time period. Out of 
49,858 flagged comments there are 40 flagged comments from 
the 1 day time period experiment labelled with A (10% 
threshold from forward analysis) which are also labelled with 
10% threshold from backward analysis. Next, followed by 49 
flagged comments from the 3 days’ period labelled with A 
(10% threshold from forward analysis) and 10% threshold 
from backward analysis. Lastly, there are 64 flagged 
comments from the 5 days’ period labelled with A (10% 
threshold from forward analysis) and 10% threshold from 
backward analysis. 
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TABLE V.          TOTAL NUMBER OF FLAGGED COMMENTS THAT MATCHED 
10% THRESHOLD FROM BOTH FORWARD AND BACKWARD ANALYSIS 
 10% 1D 10% 3D 10% 5D 
C (<5%) 204 291 366 
Y (5%) 99 62 100 
A (10%) 40 49 64 
R (15%) 79 85 97 
 
Table VI shows the total number of flagged comments that 
matched 15% threshold from both forward and backward 
analysis for the 1 day, 3 days and 5 days’ period. Out of 
49,858 flagged comments there are 199 flagged comments 
from the 1 day time period experiment labelled with R (15% 
threshold from forward analysis) which are also labelled with 
15% threshold from backward analysis. There are 408 flagged 
comments from the 3 days’ time period labelled with R (15% 
threshold from forward analysis) and 15% threshold from 
backward analysis. Lastly, there are 500 flagged comments 
from the 5 days’ time period labelled with R (15% threshold 
from forward analysis) and 15% threshold from backward 
analysis. 
TABLE VI.          TOTAL NUMBER OF FLAGGED COMMENTS THAT MATCHED 
15% THRESHOLD FROM BOTH FORWARD AND BACKWARD ANALYSIS 
 15% 1D 15% 3D 15% 5D 
C (<5%) 242 356 395 
Y (5%) 74 127 146 
A (10%) 42 65 94 
R (15%) 199 408 500 
 
The results in Table IV, V and VI show it is possible to 
perform backward analysis by matching the abnormal stock 
prices backwards to the flagged comments to resolve false 
positives. 
 
Take ticker symbol “BOX” as an example, there are 50 
comments belong to this stock flagged as “R (15%)” threshold 
in the forward analysis process. Subsequently, some of these 
comments are flagged with SMA 15% threshold alert in the 
backward analysis process. This indicates that there are very 
high chance of potentially illegal activities going on during ± 
2 days’ time of the comments made. A further look at these 
flagged comments can confirm a highly potential P&D crime. 
One comment suggests that P&D has indeed happened which 
pumped the price up and then dumped. Another comment 
shows that there is still an attempt to pump up the price after 
the P&D event. Author “ne14t” has a series of BOX 
comments showing that he/she could possibly involve in a 
P&D crime. 
 As an enhancement to forward analysis methodology, 
backward analysis aims to resolve false positives and reduce 
the need of a lot of manpower and time to read through 
initially flagged comments. The time taken in both forward 
and backward analysis process in this research is long; 
however, this is only due to the significant amount of data 
being processed and analysed altogether. If the prototype 
system and both methodologies are applied in real time in real 
world scenarios, it can significantly reduce the time, effort and 
cost of monitoring and detecting P&D crimes on FDBs. 
Therefore, this concluded that the hypothesis is met. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper has introduced two novel methodologies for 
detecting potentially illegal activities on share price based 
FDBs by looking not only at the comments but also the per 
minute share prices. IE techniques were used to collect FDB 
artefacts such as ticker symbol, comments and prices which 
made the forward analysis possible to be conducted in this 
research. A total of 49,858 comments were flagged when 
matching against the P&D IE keyword template. In average, 
this is 4,154 flagged comments per week or 593 flagged 
comments a day. More importantly, these comments belong to 
only 941 listed companies, not the entire stock market in the 
UK. In order to perform a more realistic investigation into 
such financial crime on all the FDBs and for all listed 
companies in the UK on a daily basis, the forward and 
backward analysis methodologies integrate share prices in the 
analysis process. This makes it possible for the relevant 
authorities to prioritise on investigating the flagged comments 
that have higher risks. The methodologies implemented in 
FDBM can significantly reduce the time and efforts needed by 
the relevant authorities to investigate P&D crime on FDBs in 
real time. This research considers integrating Semantic 
Textual Similarity (STS) technique into our overall 
methodology as part of the near future work. 
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